This paper studies the impact of foreign transfers on the recipient country''s aggregate economic performance, as well as its distribution of wealth and income, within a dynamic two-sector dependent economy framework. The transfers may take the form of a pure flow of resources, devoted to debt reduction, or alternatively they may be allocated to the productivity enhancement of the traded or nontraded sector, via investment in the sector's infrastructure. The effect of the transfer on aggregate economic performance depends crucially upon: (i) the relative capital intensities of the two productive sectors, and (ii) the allocation of the transfers across the sectors. The consequences for wealth and income inequality depend not only upon these two factors, but also upon (iii) the economy's access to the world financial market. Most of the analysis is conducted using numerical simulations, where we characterize the dynamic evolution of both the aggregate economy and wealth/income inequality. Whether growth and inequality are positively or negatively associated over time depends upon the three factors noted above. In this regard, the analysis can be reconciled with the contrasting range of empirical evidence.
Introduction
The role of price adjustments in the international transfer of resources is one of the classic issues in international economics. It first gained prominence in the debate surrounding the war reparations imposed on Germany at the conclusion of World War I. At issue was whether or not the payment of reparations inflicted a secondary burden on Germany, by causing a deterioration in its terms of trade, giving rise to the so-called "transfer problem"; see Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929) .
A similar issue arose in the 1970s, in connection with the discovery of natural resourcesminerals in the case of Australia, and oil in the case of Northern Europe -and their resulting revenue streams. It was argued that by increasing the supply of tradable goods and lowering their relative price, productive factors will migrate to the nontraded sector, thereby reducing the size of the country's traditional export sector and thus adversely affecting its growth rate. This problem became known as the "Dutch disease" and was first analyzed by Gregory (1976) in the Australian context, and by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) in the case of North Sea oil. More recently, the role of relative price movements and potential Dutch disease effects has been addressed in assessing the benefits of foreign aid. Most of this work has been empirical and the evidence is generally inconclusive.
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The main analytical vehicle for examining the effects of the international transfers is the twosector "dependent economy model", in which the production side of the economy is divided into a traded and a nontraded sector. 2 While this has become a standard workhorse model of international economics, it has focused exclusively on the impact of the transfers on the performance of the aggregate economy, emphasizing two structural characteristics as being critical. The first is the relative capital intensities of the production technologies adopted by the two sectors. Second, is the use to which the transfers are applied within the recipient economy. Traditionally, the literature assumed that the foreign transfer takes the form of a pure income flow, the direct effect of which is 1 For examples of the diverse range of empirical results obtained, see e.g., Nkusu (2004) , Rajan and Subramanian (2005) , and Kang, Prati, and Rebucci (2007) . 2 The dependent economy model, as it originated with Salter (1959) and Swan (1960) was purely static. Dynamic extensions have been developed by a number of authors including Bruno and Sachs (1982) , Brock and Turnovsky (1994) , Turnovsky and Sen (1995) , Brock (1996) , and Kuralbayeva and Vines (2008) .
to enhance the country's overall resources and increase its levels of consumption and savings. Any effects on output or production are indirect, resulting from the sectoral factor movements induced by the relative price changes. But in practice, the revenue received by a country from abroad may be directly applied to productivity enhancement, and in the case of transfers granted by the European Union to potential candidates this was in fact required as a condition for membership. 3 To the extent that the transfer is invested in enhancing productive capacity, thereby directly altering relative sectoral productivities, it will further influence relative prices, and therefore resource allocation. A recent paper by Cerra, Tekin, and Turnovsky (2009) conducts comprehensive numerical simulations to address both the quantitative and qualitative consequences of these allocational aspects. They assume that the transfer can be devoted to three potential uses. First, it may be of the traditional form, a pure income flow, the direct effect of which is to increase consumption and savings. Second, it may be allocated to the productivity enhancement of the traded sector, and third, it may be similarly allocated to the nontraded sector. Their analysis highlights how each allocation of the transfer generates a dramatically different time path for the aggregate economy, with sharply contrasting consequences for economic performance and welfare.
While the effects of the foreign transfers for the aggregate economy have been studied extensively, virtually no attention has been devoted to addressing their consequences for either wealth or income distribution. Yet, given the central role played by relative price adjustments in the transmission process and their impact on relative factor returns, this is an important aspect deserving careful scrutiny. Indeed, empirical evidence suggesting that both Australia and Norway have experienced significant (and divergent) changes in income inequality over the three decades since the beginning of their respective resource booms further underscores this view. 5 Hence the objective of this paper is to investigate in some detail the linkages between international transfers and both wealth and income inequality.
While the lack of literature focusing on the distributional aspects of transfers may seem surprising, it may be due in large part to analytical difficulties. In a completely general setup, in which the equilibrium growth rate and income distribution are mutually dependent, their joint determination and the analysis of their relationship becomes intractable; see e.g. Sorger (2000) . Caselli and Ventura (2000) , and more recently García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006 Turnovsky ( , 2007 Turnovsky ( , 2008 , exploit the fact that if the utility function is homogeneous in its relevant arguments, the aggregate economy can be summarized by a representative agent, as a result of which aggregate behavior becomes independent of the economy's distributional characteristics. While familiarity with this aggregation property dates back to Gorman (1953) , by rendering the analysis so tractable, it assumes particular importance in studying the growth-inequality relationship. Moreover, the class of utility function for which this aggregation simplifies in this way includes the constant elasticity utility function that seemingly dominates contemporary macrodynamic theory.
But the aggregation that we have just alluded to also depends upon the source of the heterogeneity. In this model, the heterogeneity generating the underlying inequality stems from agents' initial endowments of assets, which includes internationally traded bonds as well as domestic capital. By identifying agents' heterogeneity with their initial physical asset endowments, we are embedding distributional issues within a more traditional growth-theoretic framework. Indeed, the role of the return to capital, which is essential in that literature, has largely been ignored in the recent discussions of income inequality. The argument that the return to capital is essential to understanding distributional differences has, however, been addressed by Atkinson (2003) , and is supported by recent empirical evidence for the OECD (see Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008) . 6 The sequential structure which enables the aggregate equilibrium to be determined independently of distribution extends to the analysis of the alternative inequality measures. First, having derived the equilibrium time path of the aggregate economy we can then determine the evolution of wealth inequality. The key determinant of this turns out to be the behavior of aggregate consumption along the transitional path and its implications for the differential savings rate across the changing distribution of the heterogeneous agents. Second, the evolution of income inequality is 6 Other papers to generate heterogeneity from agents' initial endowments of wealth include Sorger (2000) , Maliar and Maliar (2001) , Caselli and Ventura (2000) and Turnovsky and García-Peñalosa (2008) . An alternative source of heterogeneity in the earlier literature was the rate of time preference as in Becker (1980) and Lucas and Stokey (1984) where the most patient agent ends up holding all capital. Another example is imperfect capital markets with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks as in Aiyagari (1994) , where less wealthy agents face tighter borrowing constraints.
then determined by the interaction of the (known) changing wealth inequality with the changing fraction of income from assets as a share of personal income. Finally, we show how arguably the most relevant inequality measure -welfare inequality -is precisely reflected by long-run after-tax income inequality and furthermore, remains constant over time.
Although the various inequality measures are structurally related in this straightforward way, being embedded in a high order dynamic system requires us to conduct our analysis almost entirely by numerically simulating a two-sector production model. In general, we find that transfers may either increase or decrease wealth inequality, depending upon where the resources are allocated and the resulting impact on the dynamics of aggregate consumption. As a general characteristic we find that if the transfer leads to a decrease in consumption (increase in savings) along the transitional path, then since wealthier people save more, wealth inequality will increase. This tends to occur if the transfer is allocated to the traded sector, with the increase in price of nontraded goods, while the opposite applies when the transfer is devoted to the nontraded sector. The impact of a pure transfer on wealth inequality is small, but highly dependent upon the relative sectoral capital intensities.
Wealth inequality directly influences income inequality. But the latter is also responsive to the relative change in the share of income from wealth to total income. Whether this latter component reinforces or offsets the impact of wealth inequality is crucially dependent upon the behavior of relative prices, which in turn is highly sensitive to the sectoral allocation of the transfers and the relative capital intensities of the two productive sectors. In the case of pure transfers, where the impact on wealth inequality is small, the capital income share effect dominates so that income inequality and wealth inequality respond in opposite ways. Finally, intertemporal welfare inequality declines with transfers that are either untied or allocated to the nontraded sector. When they are allocated to the traded sector whether welfare inequality decreases or not depends in part on the sectoral capital intensities.
One other element that is potentially important in determining the impact of transfers on inequality is the accessibility to the international financial market, as measured by increasing borrowing costs. While its effect in the case of untied transfers is mild, unimpeded access to international financial markets causes tied transfers to lead to substantial increases in wealth inequality if applied to the traded sector, and decreases when applied to the nontraded sector. These responses are in turn reflected in income inequality, as well as in wealth inequality. The key factor is the response of the relative price in these cases.
Much of the literature on income inequality since the pioneering work of Kuznets (1955) focuses on its tradeoff with growth. Yet despite the intensive research activity that this issue has generated, the nature of the relationship remains unresolved, the empirical evidence yielding both positive and negative growth-inequality relationships. 7 From a theoretical perspective, the diversity of empirical estimates should not be surprising. Because an economy's growth rate and its income distribution are both endogenous equilibrium outcomes, the growth-income inequality relationshipwhether positive or negative -will reflect the underlying sets of forces to which both are reacting.
As will become apparent, the diversity of the responses to the allocation of the foreign transfers provide just another example of the complex nature of the growth-inequality tradeoff.
To the extent that the transfers are associated with a resource boom, our analysis relates to other existing studies, of which the most similar is Goderis and Malone (2008) . While they also employ a two-sector model, our approach differs in several key respects. First, they abstract from the international capital market, the degree of access to which is important; second they focus on inequality in terms of relative factor shares rather than the more relevant heterogeneity across agents; and third they restrict the resource boom to generating an untied transfer. Other papers focus on different aspects and adopt very different analytical approaches. For example, Birdsall, Pinckney, and Sabot (2001) and Gylfason (2001) consider the tradeoffs between investment in resources and human capital, arguing that resource abundant countries on average invest less in education, leading to more income inequality. The cross sectional empirical study by Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez and Shott (1999) supports this argument, suggesting how natural resource abundance in Latin America may be the reason for low human capital accumulation and hence, higher inequality. But using a data sample of 18 Latin American countries, Blanco and Grier (2008) , reach a contrary conclusion.
They find that in the long-run, while there is a positive effect of resource abundance on physical 7 García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006) review the range of empirical evidence and refer to alternative analytical frameworks that may help interpret and reconcile the diverse empirical results.
capital, it has no effect on human capital accumulation and hence no evidence of a "resource curse".
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of the economy and derives the macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the distributions of wealth and income and highlights the main analytical relationships. Section 4 sets out the numerical calibration, while Sections 5-7 analyze the effects of various transfer allocations on wealth and income inequality. Section 8 briefly considers the role of the accessibility to the world financial market, while the concluding section focuses on some of the implications for the growth-inequality tradeoff. Finally, the Appendix provides some of the technical details
The analytical framework
The analysis extends the conventional dependent-economy model of a small open economy, to introduce agents who are heterogeneous with respect to their initial endowments of capital and foreign debt.
Technology and factor payments
Aggregate production takes place in two sectors, by a single representative firm. One sector produces a traded good T X (taken to be the numeraire) using capital, 
where both capital and labor have positive, but diminishing, marginal physical products and are subject to constant returns to scale. In addition, government spending (infrastructure) allocated to the traded sector, T G , enhances the productivity of that sector, so that 0
The other produces a nontraded good, 
8 A recent empirical study by van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) 
The aggregate firm makes its productive decisions to maximize profit, so that wage rate, w, and the return to capital, r, (expressed in terms of the traded good as numeraire) satisfy the standard efficiency conditions ( , , ) ( , , ) 9 To preserve analytical tractability these expenditures are introduced as flows, as in Barro (1990) . A natural extension would be to introduce them as public capital stocks, as in the one-sector analysis of Chatterjee et al. (2003) . However, such an extension would involve a high dimension dynamic system and would likely be intractable, even using numerical simulations.
Each agent has lifetime utility that is assumed to be an isoelastic function of traded and nontraded consumption goods,
where 1 / (1 ) η γ ≡ − is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The instantaneous utility function is assumed to be concave, the two consumption goods are assumed to be normal, while the agent's rate of time preference, ρ , is taken to be constant.
The agent is assumed to choose ,
C C and his rate of accumulation of capital, i K and foreign debt, i N , to maximize (4a) subject to his instantaneous budget constraint:
given his initial stocks of assets assumes that physical capital is produced in the nontraded sector and depreciates at the rate K δ .
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Third, a key element of the model is that while the economy has access to the international capital market, it faces a borrowing friction. We incorporate this by assuming that the international capital market imposes a premium on its lending rate to the economy, expressing this as an increasing function ( ) ω ⋅ of the ratio of the country's stock of debt, N, relative to the value of its capital stock, pK (Turnovsky, 1997)
where i* is the (given) world interest rate. It is important to emphasize that in making his decisions, agent i takes the interest rate as given. This is because the interest rate facing the debtor nation is an increasing function of the economy's aggregate debt, which the representative agent, being atomistic, assumes he is unable to influence.
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This specification contrasts with the conventional assumption that the small economy can borrow or lend unlimited amounts at a given world rate of interest. While the latter assumption is analytically convenient, it requires the imposition of restrictive knife-edge constraints for an interior solution to obtain, and is arguably less realistic anyway. 12 The nature of this financial friction has an important bearing on the country's net indebtedness as a result of transfers, and this in turn is shown to have important consequences for wealth and income inequality.
Performing the optimization yields the following first order optimality conditions
(1 ) 1
(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )
Defining agent i's total consumption by
, we may write
Thus each agent consumes the two consumption goods in the same proportion. Taking the time derivatives of (6a), and (7'), and combining them with (6c) and (6d), we obtain:
Equations (8) imply that each agent will choose the same growth rate for the two consumption goods, and overall consumption. In particular, ϕ denotes agent i's total consumption relative to the economy-wide average consumption and as we will show, essentially determines relative welfare.
The government
The government has two sources of revenue, lump-sum taxes, T, collected from residents and transfers, TR, denominated in units of traded output received from abroad. These resources can be allocated towards enhancing the productivity of the traded sector, 
This equation also implies that the direct effect of a pure foreign transfer is to reduce the tax burden of domestic residents. 13 In order to abstract from any direct (but arbitrary) distributional effects arising from lump-sum taxes or transfers to the agents, we assume that each agent faces identical tax payments. That is, ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ).
i i T t T t TR t TR t = =
The economy starts from an equilibrium with zero transfers, so that initially all expenditures are financed using lump-sum taxation (levied uniformly on all agents):
At time 0, the government receives a permanent foreign transfer, TR, which is allocated toward , ,
T N G G T in accordance with:
Thus, λ parameterizes the allocation of the transfer between tax reduction and an increase in expenditures, while φ specifies the allocation of the expenditures between the two sectors. With the transfer specified in terms of the traded good, the resources available to spend on productivityenhancing infrastructure vary inversely with the evolving relative price, ( ) p t .
Macroeconomic equilibrium
Combining (8a) and (9), the equilibrium dynamics of the economy-wide consumption is
In addition, aggregating over individual holdings of capital, nontraded goods market equilibrium 13 Equation (10) also assumes that the transfer denominated in units of traded output can be costlessly converted to nontraded output.
implies states that nontraded output in excess of domestic private or government consumption will be accumulated as capital, namely
Similarly, aggregating over each agent's debt accumulation equation, (4b), and accounting for the the nontraded goods market equilibrium, (5'), and the government budget constraint, (10), we obtain the economy's current account equation
This implies that the rate of accumulation of economy-wide average debt equals the excess of domestic private consumption of the traded good over the supply of that good, plus the interest owed on the existing stock of debt, less the transfers received. The final aggregate dynamic equation is the arbitrage equation, (6d).
The linear homogeneity of the production functions in the private factors allows us to express relations in terms of sectoral capital-labor ratios. Thus, defining /
to be the average capital-labor ratio in sector j, where j=T, N, the corresponding production functions can be expressed in intensive form as
Using the expressions for the rates of return, (3), and the fact implied by (7') that
, enables us to summarize the macroeconomic equilibrium by the relationships:
This macroeconomic equilibrium has a very simple structure. Equations (13) determine the sectoral factor allocations , ,
K N p C , the dynamic evolution of which are determined by (14). Due to the homogeneity of the utility function with respect to traded and nontraded consumption, the macroeconomic equilibrium attained is independent of any distributional aspects. This system is virtually identical to (12) and (13) studied by Cerra et al. (2009) , where the behavior of the aggregate dynamics in response to an increase in international transfers and its allocation is discussed in detail. For convenience, the linearized dynamic equilibrium is set out in the Appendix. There is no need to pursue that discussion further, except to point out that the dynamics is a saddlepoint with a two dimensional stable manifold. Along the stable equilibrium path, capital and debt evolve gradually, while consumption and the relative price of nontraded to traded goods may undergo jumps in response to new information as it comes available. But being a fourth order system, it must inevitably be analyzed numerically and thus, much of our analysis is based on a plausible calibration of the model.
In summary, the economy we consider has well functioning internal markets and has substantial, but not unimpeded, access to world financial markets. Thus, our analysis is most applicable to countries such as Greece, Portugal, and emerging market economies seeking admission to the European Union. It also may plausibly describe more developed countries like Australia and Norway, following their discovery of natural resources. But with labor and capital being perfectly mobile across sectors, we are assuming more internal flexibility than would characterize a truly developing economy, although it would be straightforward to adapt the framework to deal with that case. Moreover, as long as the impediments to sectoral factor movements involve only the flows, as in Morshed and Turnovsky (2004) , our long-run results, when all sectoral movements cease, should provide some guidance to even developing economies. 
Alternative measures of inequality
We now proceed to consider the consequences of the transfers for the evolution of wealth and income inequality, as well as the overall level of intertemporal welfare inequality.
Wealth inequality
The wealth of agent i is defined by
where we assume that 0 i V > so that the agent has net positive wealth and is therefore solvent.
Taking the time derivative of (15), using the arbitrage condition, (6d), and recalling the assumption of uniform lump sum taxation, i T T = , for all agents, we obtain
Summing (16) over all agents yields 
.
Equation (17) highlights how the evolution of an individual agent's share of relative wealth depends upon the evolution of aggregate consumption, and equilibrium prices and wages, as well as his own specific endowment as reflected in ,
14 Arellano et al (2008) formulate the impediments to sector factor mobility characterizing a developing economy in terms of a convex transformation function involving the capital stocks. This does have long-run consequences.
Before solving for the time path of i v , we first note that agent i's steady-state share of wealth
Noting from (16') and (6c) that in steady state
(18) can be written as
Thus if, for example, agent i's wealth places him above the average, his long-run marginal propensity to consume out of the above-average component of his wealth is ρ .
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Using the steady-state relationships, (A.2) in the Appendix we can show that
Thus if total government spending is less than total wages plus the transfer -a condition that is certainly met -then C V ρ > , i.e. the average propensity to consume out of wealth exceeds ρ . It then follows that wealthier agents save proportionately more and consume proportionately less.
To analyze the evolution of relative wealth, we first linearize equation (17) around the steady state. As shown in Appendix A.3, this leads to an equation of the form
Since the coefficient of ( ) i v t is positive, equation (20) highlights how the dynamics of i v is driven by the (forward-looking) transitional time paths of ( ) C t and ( ) p t .
Suppose that the economy is initially in steady state and at time t=0 it experiences a permanent increase in foreign transfers, TR. The immediate effect of this is to generate a jump in 15 From (18') we can compute the equilibrium
both (0) p and (0) C as part of the adjustment of ensuring that the economy lies on its new stable saddle path. The effect of this is to cause an initial jump in agent i's relative wealth,
The magnitude and the direction of the jump will depend upon (i) the deviation in the agent's initial relative asset endowments from the economy-wide average, and (ii) the sectoral allocation of the transfers (i.e sgn ( (0) dp ). 
In the simulations we conduct we find that ( ) p t essentially adjusts fully on impact, so that the effects of ( ) p t p − on the dynamics of relative wealth are negligible and are dominated by the dynamics of consumption, ( ) C t C − . 16 In this case we find that if the transfer leads to a decline in consumption along the transitional path (following the initial jump in (0) In all the simulations we conduct, the jump in initial wealth, (21), is small and has only modest distributional consequences. For simplicity, we shall assume that initially all agents hold the same portfolio shares, i.e. ,0
On impact, the initial distribution of wealth remains unchanged, so that ,0 ,0 ,0
Because of the linearity of (21), and (22), we can immediately transform these equations describing a specific agent's relative asset position into corresponding relationships for the standard deviation of the distribution of wealth, which serves as a convenient measure of wealth inequality.
Given ,0 v σ , the steady-state wealth distribution is determined by (0) δ , which in turn depends upon the expected changes in ( (0) ), ( (0) ) p p C C − − along the subsequent transitional adjustment path.
Income inequality
We shall consider the distributions of two measures of income: (i) before-tax personal income (i.e. income from wealth plus labor income), and (ii) after-tax personal income from wealth plus labor income (i.e. adjusted for any direct transfers).
Before-tax income inequality
Using the arbitrage condition, (6d), individual i's before-tax personal income is
while the average economy-wide before-tax personal income is
Dividing (24) by (25) the relative before-tax income of agent i ,
Y t i t V t y t v t Y t i t V t w t
Again, because of the linearity of (26) 
Hence, at any instant of time income inequality can be decomposed into the product of wealth inequality multiplied by the income from net wealth as a share of total income, ( ) s t . 17 The time path of income inequality reflects that of wealth inequality and the share of income from wealth
s t i t V t w t w t t s t t i t V t w t i t V t w t t
where the latter depends upon the evolution of ( ) ( ), and ( ) V t i t w t as they respond to the transfer.
Using the simplifying assumption, ,0 ,0
and is given, we see that the initial steady-state pre-transfer before-tax income inequality is 17 In a closed one sector economy with fixed labor supply and Cobb-Douglas technology, ( ) s t is constant, in which case income inequality exactly mirrors wealth inequality; see Turnovsky and García-Peñalosa (2008) . Here the access to the world financial market, together with the sectoral factor mobility allows variations in ( ) s t over time.
Following the transfer at time zero,
while in the new steady state,
Hence, we can express the evolution of the income inequality relative to its initial long-run
From equation (29) we see that income inequality will rise relative to its initial equilibrium level, if:
(i) the discounted value of aggregate wealth, V , rises; (ii) the return to labor, w , decreases. Whether this happens will depend on how the increase in foreign transfers are allocated and whether the traded or nontraded sector is more capital intensive.
After-tax income inequality
Individual i's after-tax income is
The average economy-wide income can then be expressed as
Y t i t V t w t p t T t
Dividing (24) by (24') the relative after-tax income of agent i , /
t V t y t v t i t V t w t p t T t
Thus analogous to (26) we obtain
implying the initial steady-state pre-shock after-tax income inequality is
Hence, the evolution of post-tax income inequality relative to its initial long-run inequality is
Welfare inequality
Agent i's welfare at time t is given by
Substituting (7') and i
where ( ) t Ω is the average welfare level at time t. Substituting (31) into (4a), yields an analogous relationship for the relative intertemporal welfare evaluated along the equilibrium growth path:
implying that at each instant of time, agent i's relative welfare remains constant, so that his intertemporal relative welfare, i W W , remains constant as well. Now using (18'), we can express relative welfare in the form
We can now compute a measure of welfare inequality. A natural metric for this is obtained by applying the following monotonic transformation of relative utility, enabling us to express the relative utility of individual i as
Both instantaneous and intertemporal welfare inequality, expressed in terms of equivalent units of wealth, can then be measured by the standard deviation of relative utility, and are constant, and identical to the steady-state inequality of after-tax personal income.
Comparing (28c), (28c'), and (34) yields the following rankings among the inequality measures:
Numerical Simulations
Given the complexity of the model it is necessary to analyze the consequences of a foreign transfer on the dynamics of wealth and income distribution by employing numerical simulations.
These are based on the utility function, (4a), and the following Cobb-Douglas production functions:
18 The fact that the post-tax inequality exceeds pre-tax inequality is a consequence of the fact that taxation is lump sum. If taxes are distortionary, then their comparison depends upon the tax on capital income versus that on labor income; see Turnovsky and García-Peñalosa (2008).
where, β α, characterize the respective degree of capital intensity in the two sectors, and the following specification of a convex increasing cost of debt function.
We begin by calibrating a benchmark economy using the following standard parameter values, The preference parameters , , γ θ ρ are standard, while the production 19 In all cases the equilibrium possesses the saddlepoint structure necessary to yield a unique stable adjustment path. parameters , α β and the productivity parameters , A B are chosen to ensure a plausible equilibrium sectoral labor allocation. 20 The borrowing premium, = 0.15 a , and the weight on the borrowing premium, ξ , are chosen to attain a plausible debt-output ratio. values is crucial and to ensure that they are chosen plausibly, we first determine the optimal steadystate levels of government spending.
To do so we assume that the government, operating as a central planner and starting out with zero transfers, chooses and We assume that the initial total government spending is 0.22 G = , which is financed fully with lump-sum taxation 0.22 T = . In Base Case I, total government spending is therefore 30% below its optimum. Assuming that this shortfall applies proportionately to both components, we set 0.080, 0.140
In Base Case II, total government spending is 54% below its optimum and the corresponding base components are 0.079, 0.141
This ensures that we are dealing 20 The choice of parameters, particularly those relating to the sectoral aspects, are discussed in greater detail by Morshed and Turnovsky (2004) and Cerra et al. (2009) . Our choice of government expenditure elasticities in production, 1 2 0.15, ν ν = = implies that government expenditure is equally productive in either sector, which seems like a natural benchmark, and implies that both production functions are subject to 15% increasing returns to scale. Some mild sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters suggest that our numerical results are insensitive to this assumption. 21 The data on debt-GDP ratios show a lot of cross country variation, and indeed some of the resource rich countries are creditors. Our benchmark debt-GDP ratios of around 0.40 represents a plausible average. We also consider cases of creditor countries. Results are fairly insensitive to this aspect and we do not present them; they are available on request. 22 Further increases in a beyond 15 a = have negligible effects except on the level of debt.
with an economy that initially has a substantial deficiency of infrastructure. In interpreting these numerical results it is helpful to bear in mind the following long-run responses that apply for any form of transfer. First, the exogeneity of the equilibrium interest rate implied by (A.2f) immediately yields that for given a, wealth, debt, and the value of capital (in terms of the traded good) must change proportionately dV dp dK dN
In addition, (28c) and (28c') yield the following relationships between the long-run changes in the various inequality measures:
Long-run before-tax income inequality exceeds long-run wealth inequality if and only if the long-run 23 Adam and Bevan (p. 275, 2006 ) follow a similar strategy and assume that initial public infrastructure is 50% of its optimal value. 24 Since 2000, minerals and fuel exports for Australia, Netherlands, and Norway have averaged around 5.3%, 6.5%, and 21% of their respective GDPs. In the light of this variation, our choice of 8% seems a reasonable benchmark.
change in wealth exceeds that of labor. Long-run after-tax income inequality (and therefore welfare inequality) exceeds long-run wealth inequality of and only if the long-run change in wealth exceeds that of consumption.
Increase in pure transfers
An increase in pure transfers represents a decrease in lump-sum taxes, that decreses the rate of debt accumulation, thereby increasing the consumption of both traded and nontraded goods, doing so proportionately in the long-run. It corresponds to a pure demand shock and provides a convenient benchmark for understanding the impacts of an exogenous increase in wealth and observing the role of sectoral capital intensities. In this case, the following standard results obtain: 0 dp dw dTR dTR = =
We can then show in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production functions, the aggregate quantities have the following qualitative responses
where T N Z X pX ≡ + denotes GDP measured in units of traded output. That is, while the pure transfer leads to an unambiguous increase in consumption, the effects on wealth, capital, debt, and output all depend upon the relative sectoral intensities. The key mechanism underlying (38a) is the conventional one operating in the two-sector dependent economy model; the long-run response in productive activity must reflect adjustments in the productive factors that reconcile the sectoral factor intensities in production with the fact that capital is nontraded. 25 Given the responses in (38a),
we immediately infer that a pure transfer will lead to 25 These responses are well known and discussed in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Brock (1996) , Turnovsky (1997) .
In the long run a pure transfer will raise income inequality more (less) than wealth inequality according as the nontraded sector is more (less) capital intensive than the traded sector.
5.1
Traded sector is capital intensive: (α β > )
We shall focus our attention primarily on the benchmark case of financial market accessibility, 0.15 a = , presented in the middle panel of Table 1 .A. This is identical to the equilibrium considered by Cerra et al (2009) , where it has been discussed in some detail, together with the responses of the aggregate economy to the transfer. The dynamic adjustments of the aggregate quantities are illustrated in Fig. 1 . Our comments on these will be brief and restricted to those aspects that impact most directly on inequality.
A pure transfer specified as an increase in TR of 0.20 units (approximately 8% of GDP) leads to long-run 1.9% reductions in wealth, debt, and capital, while GDP declines by 0.6%. The relative price remains unchanged in the long run, as do wages (not reported), while the sustained transfer raises consumption by10.6%. All of these responses are consistent with the underlying theory and reflect the fact that the traded sector is capital intensive.
On impact the transfer raises consumption by slightly more than 10.6%. Thereafter, it declines gradually as wealth and capital decline, as illustrated in Figs. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.6. In addition, Fig. 1.4 illustrates how the relative price remains virtually constant throughout the transition at its unchanged steady state. This figure also illustrates how for the other allocations of the transfers p jumps immediately to its new steady state, with almost no transitional dynamics. This lack of dynamics in p is characteristic of these models and stems from the perfect sectoral mobility of the productive factors. The introduction of inter-sectoral adjustment costs retards this process; see Morshed and Turnovsky (2004) . σ . The one difference is that the uniform distribution of transfers reduces long-run after-tax income inequality by 10.6%, which is equivalent to a uniform reduction in welfare inequality of 10.6%.
5.2
Nontraded sector is capital intensive: ( β α > )
The reversal of the sectoral factor intensities leads to a 2.0% increase in capital, wealth, and debt, leading to a reversal in many of the adjustments we have been discussing. In addition, longrun GDP now increases by 0.6%, while the increase in capital expands the long-run increase in consumption to 11.9%. Because of the lags associated with capital accumulation, it now adjusts only partially on impact, and thus continues to increase, albeit slowly, during the transition. As a consequence, savings declines during the transition, and with wealthier people saving more, this leads to a decrease in wealth inequality over time of just -0.6%. Pre-tax income inequality now rises over time, although non-monotonically, to a long-run increase of 1.1%. However, this increase is more than offset by the uniform distribution of the transfers and post-tax income inequality, and therefore welfare inequality, again declines, although by a slightly smaller margin than in the previous case (9.3% vs.10.6%).
Allocation of the transfer to the traded sector
Allocating the transfers to the traded good sector leads to two major differences as compared to the benchmark case of a pure transfer. First, the long-run relative price of nontraded goods increases substantially (15.9% or 20.2% depending upon sectoral capital intensity). But as Fig 1.4 clearly illustrates, the full impact occurs virtually instantaneously, so that for practical purposes there is again no transitional path for ( ) p t p − to impact on the evolution of wealth inequality. The second major difference is that with the transfer allocation to productive expenditure, we do not have the egalitarian impact of the lump-sum tax decrease.
6.1
Traded sector is capital intensive:
The increase in the productivity of the traded sector resulting from the transfer causes longrun wealth, debt, and the value of capital (expressed in terms of the traded good) to increase by 12.1%. However, with the relative price increasing by 15.9%, the long-run capital stock actually declines by 3.3%. The initial price increase leads to an initial increase in wealth (measured in traded goods) to 7.5, after which it declines along with the capital stock. Steady-state consumption increases by 15.3%, while the increase in productivity raises GDP by 14.8%.
The fact that in the short run consumption substantially overshoots its long-run increase, requiring a reduction during the subsequent transition, implies that wealth inequality increases over time, now by 2.2%. In addition, the increase in productivity in the traded sector raises wage income more than it does income from capital, so that in the short run pre-tax income inequality declines by about 4%. Over time, the initial decline in the interest rate resulting from the higher value of capital and the decline in the ( ) N pK ratio is offset, and the capital income rises relative to wage income.
Taken together with the increase in wealth inequality, pre-tax income inequality increases over time, partly offsetting the initial decline, and leading to a 0.6% log-run decline. Moreover, with no decline in lump-sum taxation associated with the transfer, post-tax income follows the same time path.
Welfare inequality therefore declines, also by about 0.06%.
6.2
When the nontraded sector is more capital intensive, aggregate capital will always increase as it requires higher input of capital in its production. As a result the economy expands proportionately more than when α β > . In the long run capital increases by 3.4%, while wealth and debt increase by 24.3% and the relative price by 20.2%. GDP and consumption each increase by over 21%. With both consumption and the relative price essentially reaching their steady-state levels instantaneously, there is virtually no effect on wealth inequality, which increases negligibly by 0.2%. The larger initial increase in the price implies that the productivity increase now raises wage income less than it does income from capital, so that in the short run pre-tax income inequality increases by about 1%.
Over time, the reversal in the initial decline in the interest rate resulting from the higher value of capital and the decline in the ( ) N pK ratio as capital is accumulated causes the capital income continues to rise relative to wage income, leading to an eventual long-run increase in both pre-tax and post-tax income inequality of around 3.0%, and an equal uniform increase in welfare inequality.
Productive Government Spending in the Nontraded Sector
If the transfers are allocated to increase the productivity of the nontraded sector and hence, increasing the supply of nontraded goods the real exchange rate will depreciate, by 9.9% or 17.0%, depending upon sectoral capital intensity. Although Fig. 1 .4 suggests some slight transitional adjustment for ( ) p t p − , when compared to Fig. 1 .6 this is clearly dominated by the pronounced transitional path for ( ) C t C − insofar as influencing the evolution of wealth inequality is concerned.
7.1
The increase in the productivity of the nontraded sector resulting from the transfer stimulates dramatically the long-run accumulation of capital by 13.6%. However, the accompanying depreciation of 9.9% means that its value in terms of the numeraire traded good increases by only 2.4% implying that foreign debt and wealth increase by this same amount. The initial decline in the price level implies that wealth initially declines to around 5.5 after which it increases along with the capital stock during the transition. The long-run increase in the economy's capital stock, accompanied by the decline in the price of nontraded goods implies that long-run GDP measured in terms of traded goods rises by 4.8% while long-run consumption increases by 7.6%.
However, the short-run decline in the price of nontraded goods implies that the initial increase in consumption is substantially moderated to something over 2%. As a result consumption undergoes a substantial increase during the transition causing wealth inequality to decline eventually by 4.9%.
In the long run the increase in capital raises the wage rate, while the return to capital, being tied to the world rate of return remains constant. Given that labor income is more uniformly distributed than capital income, this tends to reduce long-run income inequality. This is further reduced by the decline in wealth inequality [c.f. (27c)], so that long-run pre-tax income inequality declines by 7.5%. However, during the transition, income inequality responds non-monotonically.
On impact the productivity increases the real wage, while the decline in price causes an initial increase in the return to capital. On balance the former dominates and income inequality declines.
The immediate effect of the higher interest rate is to increase the rate of debt accumulation, while this is offset by the transfer. The net effect is that the interest rate spikes after a few periods, after which it declines. This pattern in the interest rate is reflected in the pre-tax income inequality, which following its initial drop, increases for around four periods, after which it declines steadily. The after-tax income inequality follows a similar pattern.
7.2
Nontraded sector is capital intensive:
This has a generally similar pattern, though there are differences in magnitudes. The capital intensity of the nontraded sector means that in the long run capital must increase more dramatically (32.6% rather than 13.6%). This exacerbates the adjustment in consumption, leading to a greater increase along its transition, and a greater decline in wealth inequality, which now is reduced by 5.9%. On the other hand, the greater increase in capital implies that the share of capital to labor income increases and this tends to increase income inequality, offsetting the effect due to the reduction in wealth inequality. Overall, long-run pre-tax income inequality declines by only 3.2% rather than 7.5%, again doing so non-monotonically.
Access to the world financial market
A key parameter in the analysis is a, which summarizes the degree of accessibility to the world financial market. Its value impacts directly on the equilibrium value of debt, and the benchmark value 0.15 a = yields an equilibrium debt-output ratio of around 0.40, which is well within the range of the empirical estimates of medium indebted economies. To determine the sensitivity of the system to a we have compared the cases 0.03 a = , (easy access to financial markets), 0.15 a = (medium access, the benchmark case), and 15 a = ( highly restricted access to world financial markets). 26 As is evident from Table 1 , the main long-run effect of the higher borrowing premium is to discourage the country from holding debt. The long-run equilibrium level of debt declines and since capital is nontraded the impact on the long-run capital stock is small, leading to an approximately equal increase in the level of wealth. The sensitivity of income inequality to the level of wealth implies that the more accessible the world financial market (the smaller a) the less the longer-run degree of income inequality.
Figs. 3-5 illustrate the sensitivity of the time paths of the wealth and income inequality measures to a in response to the various transfers. 27 Overall, the accessibility to the international capital market has only a modest impact on inequality in the case of an untied transfer. The reason is that the movements in the relative price and the interest rate, which are the driving forces behind the evolution of inequality, are so small. The most striking feature of Fig. 4 is that both wealth and income inequality generated by tied transfers increase dramatically as the country's accessibility to the international capital market declines from high access to medium access. Beyond that there is little further change. The reason is that with easy access to the world financial markets, ( 0.03
and with a lot of debt, the average consumption to wealth ratio is high. Since wealthy agents' marginal propensity to consume out of their above average-component of wealth remains ρ , the larger C V , the relatively more wealthy people save as consumption declines (tied transfer to traded 26 Since the optimal level of government spending changes depends upon a, we have adjusted ,
T N G G in order to for the initial shortfall of infrastructure to remain comparable. These adjustments have negligible effects on the comparisons. 27 For tied transfers the pre-tax and post-tax income inequalities are very close and thus only the former are illustrated. good) and the greater is wealth inequality. In both cases this increases by over 32% and is the dominant determinant of the increase in income inequality as well.
Concluding comments
In this paper we have extended the analysis of the dynamic dependent economy model to analyze the effects of foreign transfers on various measures of inequality. We conclude our discussion by asking the question that has dominated much of the literature on inequality, namely, do foreign transfers imply a positive or a negative tradeoff between the level of economic activity and inequality? As noted at the outset, both the empirical and theoretical literature examining this issue has yielded diverse answers to this question, depending upon the level of development, and the source of the underlying heterogeneity.
An examination of Figs. 1 and 2 suggests that the output-inequality relationship is even more complex in this two sector economy, depending upon (i) the allocation of the transfer and (ii) the relative sectoral capital intensities. It also depends upon the inequality measure. If the traded sector is more capital intensive, an untied transfer will lead to a small reduction in output accompanied by an increase in wealth inequality and decrease in income inequality. If the intensities are reversed, these responses will be essentially reversed. A transfer tied to productivity enhancement will always generate increased economic activity. Its distributional effects depend dramatically upon where it is applied. If it is allocated to the traded sector it will generate a moderate increase in wealth inequality, while its effect on income inequality is highly sensitive to the sectoral capital intensities.
If it is allocated to the nontraded sector wealth inequality declines substantially. Income inequality also declines, although less so.
These diverse paths may help explain the different evolutions of pre-tax income inequality experienced by Australia and Norway following their respective resource booms. Over the last 30 years income inequality in Australia has increased, while that of Norway has declined. Of course there are many potential explanations for this, but this pattern would certainly be consistent with Australia spending its resource revenues on pure transfers (tax reductions) and Norway allocating them to enhancing the productivity of the nontraded sector.
The complexity of the tradeoffs poses a challenge for policy makers concerned with the distributional consequences of their policy actions. If their objective is to increase GDP, then allocation to the traded sector is the best, although this will increase wealth inequality, income inequality, as well as welfare inequality. Allocating to the nontraded sector will still increase GDP, but by substantially less, and while simultaneously reducing these three measures of inequality.
As one final issue, we note that the choice of numeraire, a perennial problem in international trade, adds a further complication to the tradeoff. We have defined GDP in terms of the traded good as numeraire. But the substantial changes in the relative price associated with tied transfers implies that GDP defined in terms of the nontraded good as numeraire can respond very differently. For example, in Table 1 (A) whereas in all cases allocating the transfer to the traded sector leads to a substantial increase in GDP measured in terms of the traded good, the dramatic increase in p implies that GDP measured in terms of the nontraded good in fact declines. And since inequality, being a relative measure is invariant with respect to the choice of numeraire, the direction of the GDPinequality tradeoff becomes highly sensitive to the units in which activity is being measured. ---------a=0.03 (high access) _______ a=0.15 ( medium access) __ __ __ a=15 (low access) 
A.2. Linearization of the aggregate dynamic system
Linearizing equations (17a) (1 ) 
